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tain the heart of the matter. Not that the academic account is a plagiarism; it has its own scrupulousness and its own niceties, which are no mean achievement. But it ends in the same heresy. It gives us nothing new of course; we are scarcely in search of novelties in value, we could wish the truth. And the truth here is plain. Science and religion as they are happily practised are arts. The creditable and satisfying parts of modern American life are essentially artistic. Men can be happy only as artists, because to be happy men must function at the top of their bent with an end in view. The name for this sort of functioning is artistic creation. We are not all to be sculptors like Michelangelo. We are not even all to be designers of a fitting funeral and biographers of our hero, like Vasari; but we can none of us have genuine human happiness unless we seek our proper human ends. These ends only are valuable; these ends are esthetic as value itself is esthetic; and these ends are achieved only by artists. The esthetic heresy turns out to be the first dogma of a modern philosophy.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

A Fragment on the Human Mind. JOHN THEODORE MERZ. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1920. Pp. xiv + 309.

A book, despite the modest characterization of it as a "fragment," written by the distinguished author of *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, must necessarily command attention. And when such a book announces itself in the preface as voicing the author's doctrinal preferences, it can hardly fail to arouse a sympathetic interest. Yet, despite the historical erudition and the lucid style so characteristic of the author, the present treatise leaves one rather disappointed. Is this, one asks, *der Weisheit letzter Schluss*? Profound indeed are many of the author's reflections, but his general attitude towards the fundamental issues in philosophy is neither novel nor critical.

The thesis of the book is the familiar thesis of subjectivism stated uncompromisingly thus: "All knowledge, of whatever kind it may be, is contained for every individual person within the range of his own consciousness. The horizon of any person's mind contains everything that exists so far as he is concerned. There is nothing in the world for any of us but that which we in some way or other mentally experience—such experience being of various kinds, such as Sensations, Perceptions, Ideas, Emotions, Desires, Volitions or Feelings in general. These all together in their existence within our

consciousness form the only content of our knowledge, and outside of them there is for us no knowledge and no world. Any thing of which we can have neither a Sensation nor an Idea, nor an Image, nor a feeling of any kind, does not exist for us—it does not belong to the world as we know it. Everything that exists for us must be a feature in the stream of thought, must enter into the continuum of mental experience, must have, to use a metaphor, a location at some moment or for some time in the firmament of our thoughts or—to use the popular expression—of our Soul. Any one who nowadays enters upon the study of philosophy must realize this first all-important truth. It is hardly necessary to dwell on this any further” (pp. 39–40). This general conviction the author seems to regard as axiomatic and requiring no proof. And the “all-important truth” of the subjectivistic thesis confers upon the introspective method the distinction of being the philosophic method *par excellence*. Philosophy, in fact, becomes an “introspective region of research”; metaphysics coincides with psychology. But the introspective method advocated by the author differs from the older forms of it in being “synoptic” and “genetic.” The proper study of mind is a study of it as a “stream of consciousness” (William James) or a “continuum of presentations” (James Ward)—our author prefers the expression “Firmament of Thought”—in its total expanse and growth. The “Firmament of Thought” being a “whole” in the twofold sense of comprising all existence and of constituting a “connected totality,” the philosophic problems requiring solution center around the perennial antitheses of subject and object, of “inner” reality and “outer” reality, of the self and other selves, of existence and value, of science and religion. Such antitheses, according to the author, must be interpreted as distinctions *within* the “One Firmament of Thought,” the nature and significance of which a genetic study alone is able to reveal. A genetic account of these distinctions shows, quoting the author’s summary of his enquiry, that in “this continuous flow of undefined and vague sensations, certain complexes stand out from the earliest days of our infancy with more or less clearness, permanence and recurrence, and these form the beginning of our cognisance of an outer world. They acquire an independent existence over and above their purely subjective features in the stream of thought when we learn that other persons share them with us. This additional or higher form of existence we term Reality or the Real, compared with which the fleeting and less definite features of our primordial experience appear to be less real or unreal. We have also learned that this real world has many Orders and various Degrees; and in it again we distinguish a selected number of Sensations, Thoughts, Ideas, and Feelings, which we consider to have a still

higher degree of Reality variously termed Value or the truly Real. We may thus say that the contents of our Consciousness at any moment are made up of three classes or regions of reality, the lowest and largest class consisting of fleeting, undefined, and vague sensations; another class of more or less well-defined objects which we share with other persons; while a third class possesses experiences to which we attach more or less value, constituting the object of our special interest. These regions are not clearly marked off, but are apt to flow into each other; their contents wandering as it were from one class to another" (pp. 245-246). In short, synopsis or intuition reveals the mind to be a "changing whole," containing the totality of existence; while a genetic study shows how the individual mind comes into possession of ideas and ideals constitutive of an objective and social world. The pursuit of introspection both synoptically and genetically culminates for our author—the steps which are rather circuitous can not be reproduced here—in a defense of personal and religious idealism in which all our spiritual values, especially those commonly associated with Christianity, are preserved and vindicated.

Non sequitur—this is the fallacy which a careful and critical reader of this *Fragment*, not sharing the author's bias for subjectivism and its worn arguments, will have no difficulty in detecting. The author follows the widespread opinion in idealistic philosophy that the gateway to a "spiritual" conception of the world lies through an analysis of its contents in "mental" terms. The essence of the universe must first be described in terms of "ideas" before it can be appreciated in terms of "ideals." This is the motive which lies behind the idealism of Berkeley and of all those who accept his tenets. Berkeley and Berkeleyans seem to postulate an identity of meaning in the terms mental and spiritual. A spiritual conception of the world is assumed to follow inevitably from the demonstration that its constitution is mental. Once prove, so the assumption runs, that all those things which compose the world require a "mind" to describe and to account for its nature, then it can be established that all is well with the cosmos, that it is the paragon of goodness, beauty, order, rationality, in short, of all those ideals and values crystallized in the word "spirituality." But this assumption may be challenged. It is within speculative possibility to imagine a world through and through mental but revoltingly unspiritual, a world responsive to our ideas but at variance with our ideals. And it is precisely the recognition of this disparity which gives to pessimism, especially to the type made familiar by Schopenhauer, peculiar relevancy and poignancy.

It is extraordinary that such a possible objection to subjectivism does not occur to our author. And it is still more extraordinary that

recent criticisms of it should be so utterly ignored by him. There is in this *Fragment* no hint even of the modern realistic challenge to philosophic idealism both in Great Britain and America. The complete neglect of an important movement in contemporary thought, a movement directed against the very presuppositions which are here accepted as if they were self-evident, is not easy to understand, especially if one considers the author's well-known learning and acumen. Does he regard, one wonders, the postulates of subjective idealism as so unassailable that one may safely withhold attention from any of their critics? Nor is this want of attention to recent ideas confined to views to which the author is opposed. Ideas very near his own are similarly disregarded. There is, for instance, no reference anywhere to Bergson, although in many places the author's criticism of the analytical method is indistinguishable from that of the French philosopher. And Bergsonian in spirit is his defense of synopsis or intuition and his account of "mental energy" as continually increasing and thus involving both "creation" and "freedom" (Ch. XI). Again, to cite another instance, no mention is made of Royce and Baldwin, yet a theory of self-consciousness as a social contrast effect very similar to that of these two thinkers is the basis of the author's genetic interpretation of our initial and growing knowledge of self and of nature. Of these and other similarities or analogies between his views and those of recent writers the erudite historian of European thought in the preceding century could scarcely have been unconscious.

It is unfair perhaps to be so critical in dealing with a book purporting to be but a "fragment," the aim of which, as mentioned in the preface, is to state explicitly what was but implied in his larger work—the author's own philosophic creed. To have expressed with the courage and the pen of a master the typical creed of religious idealism on a Berkeleyan basis is an achievement for which we must be grateful. This form of idealism is as perennial as philosophy itself of which we can not have too many variations. But it must be confessed that after reading this particular variation of a familiar theme the realistic revolt in recent philosophy appears as singularly pertinent.

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The Child Vision: Being a Study in Mental Development and Expression. DOROTHY TUDOR OWEN. New York: Longmans, Green and Co. Manchester, Eng.: University Press. 1920. Pp. xvi + 180.